44A Trump International, Inc. v. Jesse Russell by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-21-2013 
44A Trump International, Inc. v. Jesse Russell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"44A Trump International, Inc. v. Jesse Russell" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1527. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1527 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






44A TRUMP INTERNATIONAL, INC., 




JESSE E. RUSSELL  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 2-07-cv-03425 
District Judge: The Honorable Susan D. Wigenton                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH, Circuit Judges 
and O’CONNOR, ∗Associate Justice (Ret.) 
 




  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
 
                                                 
∗ The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, sitting by designation. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 44A Trump International, Inc. (“Trump International”), appeals from the 
District Court’s order denying its motion to reopen this action pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We will affirm.  
I. 
 On or about August 9, 2001, Trump International loaned $560,000 to Jesse 
E. Russell (“Russell”). On July 24, 2007, Trump International filed this action 
against Russell alleging that he defaulted on the loan.  
 After the complaint was filed, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement. 
The settlement agreement consisted of three documents executed between Trump 
International and IncNetworks, a company owned in whole or in part by Russell. 
The first document was a Promissory Note, which provided that IncNetworks was 
to repay the full amount of the loan in thirty consecutive monthly payments of 
$20,000 at an annual interest rate of six percent. The second document was a 
Pledge Agreement, wherein IncNetworks agreed to purchase 560,000 shares of its 
own stock from Trump International as insurance against repayment of the Note. 
Finally, the parties executed an Escrow Agreement that provided for an escrow 
agent, Eric Magnelli (“Magnelli”), to hold the stock, “other collateral,” and the 
agreements in escrow. Russell was not named in any of these documents. 
 On February 4, 2009, after being informed by the parties that settlement was 
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imminent, the District Court dismissed this action without prejudice “subject to the 
right of the parties[,] upon good cause shown within 60 days, to reopen the action 
if the settlement is not consummated.” On October 28, 2009, after two sixty-day 
extensions, Trump International’s counsel informed the Court that the settlement 
had been finalized by counsel and would soon be executed by the parties. 
 Shortly after the settlement agreement was finalized, IncNetworks defaulted 
on the Promissory Note. On April 17, 2012, Trump International filed a second 
lawsuit against IncNetworks and Magnelli, seeking to recover the balance of the 
Promissory Note and the release of collateral held in escrow. See Complaint, 44A 
Trump Int’l, Inc. v. IncNetworks, No. 2:12-cv-2292 (D.N.J. April 17, 2012), ECF 
No. 1. Trump International then filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) to reopen this action against Russell and to consolidate it with the 
recently filed lawsuit against IncNetworks. Trump International argued that “[t]he 
First Action should be reopened and consolidated with the Second Action because 
the failed settlement of the First Action gave rise to the claims in the Second 
Action.” 
 On October 4, 2012, the District Court issued an order denying Trump 
International’s motion to reopen the case. It concluded this was not one of the 
extraordinary circumstances in which a party is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). 
The Court stated that Trump International “voluntarily entered into a settlement 
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agreement” that resolved its claims against Russell. And although Russell was not 
named in the settlement documents, the Court found that “if [Trump International] 
wanted to ensure that [it] could pursue Russell for the remaining debt in the event 
of IncNetworks’ default, [it] should have contracted for such terms.” Ultimately 
the Court determined that Trump International’s only recourse was to enforce the 
settlement agreement in the second lawsuit against IncNetworks, not to reopen its 
action against Russell. Trump International timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review a district court’s decision to deny relief under Rule 60(b) for 
abuse of discretion. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 Trump International contends this case should be reinstated pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(6), which provides: “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party 
or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (6) 
any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  
This Court has consistently held that Rule 60(b)(6)’s catchall provision 
“‘provides for extraordinary relief and may only be invoked upon a showing of 
exceptional circumstances.’” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 
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(3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 
1988)). Such extraordinary circumstances generally exist only where the movant 
can demonstrate that “an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result.” Budget 
Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255 (quoting Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d 
Cir. 1977)). Importantly, however, “extraordinary circumstances rarely exist when 
a party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate 
choices.” Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255; see also Coltec, 280 F.3d at 274 
(“[C]ourts have not looked favorably on the entreaties of parties trying to escape 
the consequences of their own ‘counseled and knowledgeable’ decisions.”). 
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Trump 
International’s motion to reopen this case. As the District Court explained, Trump 
International deliberately and voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement that 
resulted in the dismissal of this action. Trump International was, or should have 
been, aware that the terms of that agreement did not provide for recourse directly 
against Russell in the event of IncNetworks’ default. We agree with the District 
Court that there is no basis for reopening this action under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Therefore, we will affirm its judgment. 
